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The organization of military companies began with individuals of local prominence, either in a town or county. Those who deemed themselves 
to be leaders in some capacity had the draw to assemble 
a company in whole or in part. Previous military 
experience could be useful, but many a former militia 
officer with a reputation for being too strict would 
likely be shunned.
During the first months of the war—say, from 
May to July of 1861—forming a company was very 
much a locally controlled process. Companies would 
spring into existence overnight and would clamor for a 
regimental assignment from the governor. Since there 
were still but a handful of regiments and no shortage 
of new companies, those companies that failed to 
win a berth right away risked withering away. Which 
companies won out in the battle for a regimental 
berth depended on higher level politics, with urban 
companies having the advantage.
The aspiring company recruiter had to have 
authorization from the state adjutant general in the 
form of a recruiting commission. Armed with the 
proper paperwork, the company recruiter would 
publish notices in the local newspapers; perhaps 
establish an office in a larger town or city; hire the 
requisite wagons, flag, drummer, and bugler; gain the 
support of high-ranking community leaders to serve 
as speakers; and otherwise set out to fill up a company 
The magic number was 83 men, the minimum needed 
for an infantry company
As the roster approached that number, the captain 
could be authorized to place his men "in quarters." This 
meant that they could be locally boarded and housed. 
This was done for several reasons. The recruits had to 
be assured that there was indeed a bona fide company, 
as did the state. Company spirit could then develop
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and the company could become a cohesive group. 
The recruits, likely single young men, had to receive 
tangible results for their commitment, in the form of 
room and board, or their interest could wane. Most 
important, the recruiter had to hold the roster together. 
The recruits were sworn in to the equivalent of state 
service by local justices, but this doesn't seem to have 
been very binding.
There were problems with this system. Recruits had a multitude of needs, including medical and travel expenses, blankets, clothing, and shoes. 
But the recruiter had no monetary advance from the 
state, and anybody that he contracted with had to be 
content with holding the bill, sometimes for a very 
long time.
The major challenges were competing recruiters 
and, over time, a dearth of recruits. Partial companies 
either consolidated or they vaporized. This problem 
was most acute when a company was being raised 
across an entire county. Each town or farm neighbor­
hood would provide a contingent, and depending 
on how the men identified themselves—by ethnicity, 
politics, religion, or even occupation—these contin­
gents would have more or less in common.
These different loyalties played out when the men 
in the company voted for officers. Usually an initial 
election was held locally, and officers generally were 
elected to ranks proportionate to their contributions 
in forming the unit. But that was not always the case.
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War Department.
A d j u t a n t  G e n e r a l ’s  O f f i c e ,  7 
Washington, June 7, 1S02. >
GENERAL ORDERS, NUMBER 6S.
*
II. The Act of February 13, 1S62, Section 2, published 
in “General Orders No. 15,” aUhough prohibiting the 
discharge of minors from the service, does not authorize 
their enlistment or muster into service, except with tho 
written consent of fiieir parents, masters or guardians. 
Such consent must be taken in triplicate, and liled with 
triplicate copies of the muster rolls.
An aspiring officer could be astounded to find himself 
voted out or farther down in rank. For example, 
candidates who lost out for the captaincy would make 
a go for a lieutenancy. Most cruel, when the final 
election was held at the rendezvous camp, the comp­
any at full strength could contain a different demo­
graphic, and many a man who marched to camp as 
an officer left without that title.
Then it was time for community farewells. After the 
company banner (usually designed and sewn by local 
women) was presented with the requisite speeches and 
dinners, the new company would ride off by wagon 
or stagecoach to the nearest railhead, and then speed 
off to the rendezvous camp (many soldiers taking their 
first train ride). Iowa rendezvous camps were in larger 
towns with river or rail transportation, like Davenport, 
Keokuk, and Des Moines.
The challenge was to hold the ranks together 
numerically until official mustering in. Speed 
was always of the essence as recruiters struggled 
desperately to complete their companies and join a 
regiment. Partial companies accumulated in camp, 
and they either coalesced or withered away.
The final test was the medical review; companies 
could be rendered nonviable when as many as a dozen 
eager recruits were sent home. Another cause for loss 
of men was the refusal of a few to take the federal oath 
(even though they had already taken the state oath). 
These men were publicly humiliated and drummed 
out of camp, but their departure also threatened the 
minimal strength of the promising company.
Once these adjustments were made, a recruiting 
feeding frenzy ensued, targeting the frag­
mentary squads in camp to finalize both the 
companies and their regiment.
The first company to muster in at the 
rendezvous camp—which meant that it had 
reached mustering strength and its men had 
passed their physical examinations—would 
get the coveted " Company A" designation in 
a new regiment.
*
By order of the Secretary of War,
L. THOMAS, Adj't General. 
Forms can be had at the Adjutant GeTBeral’s OlT 
of this State.
A regiment (which comprised 10 infantry companies or 12 cavalry companies) could be formed in at least three 
ways. First, influential individuals could apply 
to the governor for authorization to raise 
an entire regiment. Second, the state could 
form a regiment in the rendezvous camp by 
assigning companies to it.
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S t a t e  o f  I o w a .
Adjutant General's Office, ) 
Clinton, Aug. 11, 1862. j
GENERAL ORDERS, NUMBER SI.
J. The Camp* at dif ferent  places in this State
for the new Regiments, will be known and designated as 
follows :
At Keokuk, Camp Lincoln.
At Clinton, Camp Kirkwood.
At Dubuque, Camp Franklin.
At Iowa City, Camp Dope.
At Des Moines, Camp Burnside.
At Muscatine, Camp Strong.
Ii. Passes from this Department will hereafter he 
either signed by me, or by M. H» Tyrrell, for me. If 
signed “ X. B. Baker, AdPt Gen’l of Iowa, by Tyrrell/* 
they are to be respected the same as those signed by me.
N. B. Ii \ KER, 
Adj’t General of Iowa.
The third way to form a regiment was for 
quite prominent individuals to bypass the 
state and receive direct authorization from the 
U.S. War Department. These individuals often 
assumed incorrectly that such authorization 
would bring immediate support in the form 
of equipage, commissions, and funds, and that 
the regiment would be more quickly organized 
and sent into active service. The reality was 
that these new regiments "fell through the 
administrative crack" and found themselves 
orphan organizations and sometimes faded 
away. The War Department lacked the 
wherewithal to directly support the units 
it authorized, and the state was more than 
pleased to be relieved from assuming any 
responsibility for yet another new regiment.
Raising an entire regiment brought rich rewards. The principals would receive field officer commissions (colonel, lieutenant colonel, or major). 
In turn, they could reward others by influencing the 
awarding of staff officer berths (adjutant,quartermaster, 
commissary, or surgeon). But the real plum resided in 
the social status that came with these positions, not to 
mention the opportunities for meteoric advancement, 
either during the war or later in politics.
The real work in organizing a regiment lay in 
completing the requisite number of companies. The 
aspiring colonel, in the early war years, was often 
given complete control (particularly for cavalry 
regiments). Again, the state was more than pleased 
to have one fewer new regiment to deal with, and 
these delegated units were usually placed in one of 
the isolated and less important rendezvous camps. 
It was the colonel-to-be who was now deluged with 
requests for recruiting commissions from aspiring
captains-to-be.
The same dynamic exhibited in company 
organizations now played out times ten or more. 
Invariably the regiment ended up in camp short at 
least a few companies. As promised units collapsed, 
entirely new ones had to be started. The regiment 
couldn't organize until it had all of its companies in 
camp at minimum strength. Aspiring field officers 
accumulated personal expenses as they awaited their 
commissions and authority to spend funds.
This situation was worst in the camps at Council 
Bluffs, where the 29th Infantry was sorely delayed 
in finalizing its company rosters. The recruits lacked
clothing, the officers had exhausted their own funds, 
and nobody was getting paid until they were mustered 
in. The state had no authority or obligation over recruits 
until the mustering in took place, so it was powerless 
to help.
Like the company, the regimental community 
elected its initial roster of field officers. Many difficulties 
resulted as candidates were denied their "promised" 
rank or the state intervened with its own chosen 
colonel. A number of regimental colonels were washed 
out at the rendezvous camp; commanding a regiment 
required a somewhat different skill set than did raising 
one. Once in active service, the real winnowing out 
began as the regimental officer corps reshuffled their 
rosters. ❖
James E. Jacobsen is a historic preservation consultant in Des 
Moines. This article is an excerpt from Jacobsen's "Iowa's Civil 
War Rendezvous Camps, 1861-1866: A Study." Funded by 
the lozva Army National Guard, State of Iowa, and National 
Guard Bureau, Department of Defense, the study will be posted 
on www.lowaNationalGuard.com.
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